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Implications and Conclusions
his case study of the WTO–Cartagena Protocol relationship provides two general
insights into international policy coordination between trade agreements and MEAs.
First, they are likely to be in concert when (1) the MEA has a narrow scope and (2) there
exists a transatlantic consensus on the systemic regulatory principles required to deal with
the particular issue. Second, inversely, they are likely to be in conflict when the MEA has
a broad scope and when there exists transatlantic regulatory regionalism – precisely the
characteristics present in the WTO–Cartagena Protocol relationship. This international
policy conflict creates fragmented international markets, decreasing the economies of
scale; producers of GMOs, however, depend on economies of scale to recoup the
considerable research and development costs they incur.
Introduction
In a broad sense, international policy coordination has the objective of solving policy
(mis)alignment issues between sovereign nations through bilateral, plurilateral or
multilateral negotiations. For example, monetary policy coordination represents an
attempt to control the international spillover effects that foreign policies can have on
domestic inflation and employment (Persson and Tabellini, 2000). International trade
policy coordination represents an attempt to solve multinational market failures that
prevent the efficient allocation of resources; such failures arise when nations do not
engage in economic activities consistent with their comparative advantage (Gaisford and
Kerr, 2001). Similarly, international environmental policy coordination represents an
attempt to solve problems of environmental degradation that arise when nations acting in
their own best (economic) interest fail to act in the best interest of global biodiversity
(Helm, 2000; Killinger, 2000).
Despite the sensibleness of coordinating across policy domains to achieve global
gains, international policy coordination is rarely an easy undertaking. For instance,
multilateral efforts to liberalize international trade, such as the Uruguay Round and the
current Doha “Development” Agenda, often take much longer than initially expected and
often involve several significant crises that threaten the entire round. Even at a regional or
plurilateral level, policy coordination is difficult, as the European Union’s efforts to
establish the Single European Market demonstrate. The challenge for international policy
coordination is that the objective of maximizing global gains is sometimes not consistent
with that of maximizing domestic gains. A national government, elected by domestic –
not international – constituents, may simply lack the political will to engage in activities
that increase global welfare at the expense of domestic welfare. And if one nation faces
this dilemma, others do as well, creating a market failure of collective action (Olson,
1965).
Successful multilateral efforts in international policy coordination may result in the
creation of multilateral paradigms. For example, the creation of the World Trade
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Organization in 1995 from the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations represents the
international trade paradigm codifying the rights and obligations of nation-states that wish
to be WTO members. Similarly, the creation of the Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) from the1992 Earth Summit represents the international biodiversity paradigm
codifying the commitments to the protection of biodiversity made by the CBD’s ratifying
nations.
While there is a significant body of literature on how these multilateral paradigms
emerge (Gilpin, 2001), there is a limited amount of literature on what happens when these
multilateral paradigms overlap (Isaac, Phillipson and Kerr, 2002). In this article, the
international policy coordination problem arising from overlapping multilateral paradigms
is examined through a case study of the relationship between the WTO and a multilateral
environmental agreement known as the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (Cartagena Protocol) with respect to international
trade in products of modern biotechnology. An institutional analysis methodology
1 is
adopted to assess the degree of concert or conflict between these two multilateral
paradigms in order to understand the ramifications of the overlap for the Canadian agri-
food sector.
This article is organized as follows. In the next section, the context of the trade-
environment relationship will be presented and, in the section that follows, the two
overlapping multilateral paradigms will be outlined. In the final section, the impact of the
overlapping multilateral paradigms upon the international trade of products of modern
biotechnology will be discussed.
International Trade and Environmental Protection
The relationship between international trade agreements and measures to protect the
environment has received enough attention that in Articles 31 to 33 of the Doha Agenda’s
Ministerial Declaration there are calls for greater clarification on this issue. Despite this
attention, however, the actual record has not been that antagonistic at all. In 2001, the
WTO’s Committee on Trade and the Environment recognized 238 MEAs, 32 of which
were deemed to contain trade-distorting provisions (WTO CTE, 2001). Three particularly
trade-distorting MEAs include: the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered
Species 1973 (CITES); the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer 1987 (Montreal Protocol); and the Basel Convention on the Transboundary
Movement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal 1989 (Basel Convention). Despite
their trade-distorting provisions, to date no MEAs have been directly challenged under the
auspices of the WTO. Instead, they have peacefully co-existed.
The following question then emerges: What are the factors that explain why trade-
environment relationships are in concert and, inversely, could be in conflict? Applying an
institutional analysis methodology across the 32 most trade-distorting MEAs reveals that
two factors are common to all of them. First, when the environmental issue tackled by theCurrent Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues G.E. Isaac
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MEA is narrow, there seems to be an increased likelihood that nations are willing to abide
by the environmental protection measures even if they may, in fact, hinder international
trade, because the measures do not spill beyond this narrow issue. Trade in endangered
species, ozone-depleting substances and hazardous wastes all fit this criterion of being
narrow environmental issues. It appears that while the first factor seems to be a necessary
condition it is not a sufficient condition for a harmonious trade-environment relationship.
The second important factor is the presence of a transatlantic agreement on the issue.
That is, if the United States and the EU can agree that the environmental measure
deserves attention and that the regulatory response outlined in the MEA is acceptable (that
is, there is consistency between the U.S. and the EU regulatory approaches), the
likelihood of conflict with the international trading regime appears to decrease. Again,
protection of endangered species, the ozone layer and domestic biodiversity from
hazardous wastes are policy goals shared with virtually equal fervour on both sides of the
Atlantic.
The WTO and the Cartagena Protocol
Given the above discussion, two overlapping multilateral paradigms – the WTO and the
Cartagena Protocol – can now be assessed again using the institutional analysis
methodology, beginning with a discussion of their respective mandates which,
consequently, manifest themselves into path-dependent regulatory trajectories. The
research question is simple: Are these multilateral paradigms likely to be in concert or
conflict?
The World Trade Organization
The WTO has a narrow mandate of trade liberalization for goods and services based on
the principle of non-discrimination (PND) (Isaac, 2002). There are basically three
concepts embedded in the PND. The first is the concept of like products whereby trade
agreements do not focus on how a good (or service) is processed or produced, but rather
on the end-use attributes of the good (or service). A cotton shirt is like a cotton shirt
regardless of whether the cotton was produced in an intensive or organic agricultural
system. The second concept is that of national treatment whereby foreign goods or
services must be treated the same in terms of market access rules as like domestic goods
and services. The third concept is that of most-favoured nation whereby the favourable
market access enjoyed by one particular foreign producer must be extended to all foreign
producers of like products. Together, these three concepts combine within the PND to
produce multilateral reciprocity. Moreover, they become the default principle whereby
domestic measures are trade compliant if they pass the default test of non-discrimination.
The benefit of this system is that it moves toward a rules-based system, allowing for
international trade to be a commercial function and not a government-to-government
function.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues G.E. Isaac
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Yet, recognizing that the principle of non-discrimination cannot always apply,
specific trade agreements, such as the Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary
Standards (SPS Agreement), outline the instances where a country can legitimately violate
the PND (Isaac and Kerr, 2003). For example, if Canada has a scientifically sound reason
for banning a particular foreign product because of a risk to human, plant or animal
health, that ban does not have to apply to all foreign and domestic producers of like
products.
2 That is, any or all of the three concepts of non-discrimination – like products,
national treatment and most-favoured nation – may be suspended by the importing
country at its own discretion.
When the techniques and procedures of genetic modification produce crops with
production-traits (that is, without any output traits that would make the product
distinguishable from non-GM crops) they are considered to be like products under the
international trading regime. Therefore, due to the absence of scientific justifications for
banning GM crops, the WTO – consistent with the PND – does not explicitly focus on
market access for GM crops as distinct from non-GM crops (Isaac and Kerr, 2003). In
other words, the WTO supports a product-based approach to GM crops (Isaac, 2002).
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
to the Convention on Biological Diversity
Signed in January 2001 and entered into force on September 11, 2003 (after 50 signatory
countries had ratified) is the Cartagena Protocol, an MEA with a mandate to protect
environmental biodiversity from the transboundary movement (i.e., trade) of living
products of modern biotechnology. Two significant differences between the Cartagena
Protocol and the WTO may be identified. The first is that the Cartagena Protocol supports
a process-based approach whereby it is the use of modern biotechnology – regardless of
the impact upon the end like product – that triggers regulatory oversight.
The second significant difference is that while the WTO’s underlying regulatory
principle is the principle of non-discrimination, underlying the Cartagena Protocol is the
principle of advance informed agreement (PAIA). Modelled initially on the Basel
Convention (Isaac, 2002), the Cartagena Protocol essentially treats products of
biotechnology as hazardous waste whereby the government of the importing country
(party of import) must be notified by the government of the exporting country (party of
export) of the intended transboundary movement of living products of biotechnology to
allow the party of import to conduct its own risk analysis and determine the risk to
domestic biodiversity prior to the shipment. Without a link to the international trading
regime or to international scientific organizations, the Cartagena Protocol basically
permits parties of import to set market access bans according to any factors which they
deem fit. Therefore, while the WTO aims at removing governments from the act of
deciding market access, the Cartagena Protocol elevates the role of government, making
the transboundary movement of living modified organisms a government-to-government
activity.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues G.E. Isaac
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Combining the process-based approach with the principle of advance informed
agreement results in a highly precautionary protocol that treats the products of modern
biotechnology as hazardous wastes such that parties of import have sufficient room to
make unilateral market access decisions while exporters and parties of export have
virtually no recourse.
Transatlantic Differences
The incongruence between the WTO and the Cartagena Protocol’s approach to the
international regulation of biotechnology is reflected in the current transatlantic regulatory
regionalism which prevents consensus on how to appropriately regulate products of
modern biotechnology. On one hand, the United States (along with Canada) essentially
favours a product-based approach triggered by scientific evidence of risk or hazard that is
consistent with the WTO approach. On the other hand, the EU favours a process-based
approach triggered by the precautionary principle that is consistent with the Cartagena
Protocol. The differences in approach led to a request to the WTO (May 13, 2003) by the
United States and Canada, along with Argentina and Egypt, for a consultation on the EU
moratorium on market approval of GMOs, which had been in place since 1998. In late
July the EU announced that it would end the moratorium as new regulations were put into
place. The WTO request was not withdrawn, because the EU’s moratorium was only a
symptom – the real problem is the transatlantic regulatory differences, which the new EU
regulations did not bridge (they maintained a process-based approach fundamentally at
odds with the U.S. approach). It is most likely that the consultation will evolve into an
acrimonious trade dispute pitting the North American against the EU approach. The
consequences are significant because the implicit conflict will be between the WTO’s
approach to biotechnology regulations (as supported by the United States) and the
Cartagena Protocol’s approach to biotechnology regulations (as supported by the EU).
That is, for the first time there will be conflict between the WTO and an MEA.
WTO, Cartagena Protocol and Transatlantic Differences
Given the differences outlined above, it is clear that the factors conducive to a harmonious
trade-environment relationship are not present with respect to the two multilateral
paradigms for regulating biotechnology products. Moreover, there appears to be very little
likelihood of convergence because it would require either side to abandon their
fundamental regulatory approaches. Given the significant commercial lead enjoyed in
North America it is unlikely that the regulatory structure will revert to a precautionary,
process-based approach that would treat biotechnology products as hazardous or toxic
wastes. Inversely, given the politicization of the GMO issue, it is unlikely that the EU will
undertake a dramatic withdrawal from the process-based system and allow for widespread
market access of what are largely considered to be foreign technologies (Isaac, 2002).Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues G.E. Isaac
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Implications and Conclusions
Clearly, international policy coordination in the area of agricultural biotechnology is a
major challenge given the presence of both multilateral (WTO v. Cartagena Protocol) and
regional (United States/Canada v. EU) regulatory differences. Several problems for the
agri-food sector arise.
First is the problem of forecasting which regulatory approach will prevail. On the one
hand, it is entirely reasonable to argue that the current EU/Cartagena Protocol support is
the result of a commercial lag (it is much easier to adopt a precautionary approach when
the GM crops are foreign and not domestic products), but when domestic products are
ready a more technologically progressive approach will emerge in the EU, which will then
influence the Cartagena Protocol. On the other hand, it is also entirely reasonable to argue
that the North American/WTO approach lacks sufficient social responsiveness and
therefore must change in the face of consumer concerns about environmental
sustainability and corporate control over the food supply. Therefore, given the remote
likelihood of convergence and the two plausible arguments presented above, it is difficult
to forecast which regulatory approach will prevail.
Second, in the meantime, fragmented international markets produce a decrease in the
economies of scale required to recoup the considerable research and development costs
incurred by producers of GMOs. Incongruent multilateral paradigms have the effect of
institutionalizing agricultural trade barriers whereby WTO-incompliant measures may in
fact be supported by the Cartagena Protocol. The result is incredibly unpredictable
international markets for Canadian agri-food exports that contain (or may contain) GMOs
– incisively illustrated by the current debates over the introduction of Monsanto’s Round-
Up-Ready wheat to the Canadian prairies.
Third is the more general problem of antagonism between agri-food trade and
environmental protection efforts perhaps producing an entrenched conflict whereby
MEAs are negotiated not as complementary agreements but rather as countervailing
forces to trade liberalization agreements. This case study of the WTO–Cartagena Protocol
relationship provides two general insights into international policy coordination between
trade agreements and MEAs. They can be in concert when (1) the MEA has a narrow
scope and (2) there exists a transatlantic consensus on the systemic regulatory principles
required to deal with the particular issue of concern to the drafters of the MEA. On the
other hand, they may be in conflict when the MEA has a broad scope and when there
exists transatlantic regulatory regionalism – precisely the characteristics present in the
WTO–Cartagena Protocol relationship.Current Agriculture, Food & Resource Issues G.E. Isaac
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Endnotes
1 An institutional analysis methodology is appropriate for the comparative analysis of the
similarities and differences among institutions and is a common empirical approach in
International Political Economy literatures. Accordingly, comparators are identified
typically consisting of, but not limited to (1) origins of the institution; (2)
objectives/mandates/scope of the institution; (3) membership structure; (4) underlying
regulatory principles and path-dependent regulatory trajectories; as well as (5) decisions
and actions taken by the organization.
2 Scientific justifications are determined to be sound not by the WTO but by one of the
following three international scientific agencies to which the WTO defers: (1) Codex
Alimentarius Commission (food safety and human health); (2) International Office of
Epizootics (animal safety and health); and (3) International Plant Protection Convention
(plant safety and health).